Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment

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Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment

INTRODUCTION

Litigation against directors and officers is ubiquitous in bankruptcy courts. Indeed, charges of director malfeasance and breach of fiduciary duty are leveled at the outset of many bankruptcy cases—whether in the hallways outside of first day hearings or creditors committee formation meetings, in early hearings, or in pre-petition letter writing campaigns aimed at encouraging or discouraging specific board actions. These charges frequently wind their way into litigation, typically later in the bankruptcy case.1

While the bankruptcy field has become accustomed to this practice, it bears noting in a Stern v. Marshall2 world that breach of fiduciary duty and deepening insolvency are state law concepts, not portions of the Bankruptcy Code.3 However, bankruptcy courts try the overwhelming majority of litigation and decide most of the reported case law. Thus, director and officer litigation claims have become standard “bankruptcy litigation.”4 The reason is fairly straightforward: suits alleging breach of fiduciary duty and the like are much more likely to be filed when a business strategy has failed, precisely because it has failed (there isn’t much sense in challenging an objectively successful outcome),5 and the fact that a company has filed a bankruptcy case often means that business strategies can be characterized

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2. 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2604 (2011).
3. Certain opinions hold that the post-petition conduct of a board is governed by a federal common law fiduciary duty. However, charges of post-petition breach of fiduciary duty are rare. See infra Part III.D.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part II.

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(not always accurately) as having failed. Moreover, the fact of bankruptcy means that a fiduciary, such as a Chapter 11 or 7 trustee, a creditors committee, or a post-plan confirmation trust set up to pursue litigation claims, typically will be appointed, thereby avoiding the “collective action” problem outside of bankruptcy. And the bankruptcy process itself often makes funding for these types of suits available, for example by agreed or court ordered carve outs from a secured lender’s collateral. Taken together, this means that since no individual creditor has to fund what could be expensive litigation, director and officer claims alleging wrongdoing in the face of insolvency get pursued in bankruptcy cases more often than they do outside bankruptcy.

Thus, while much has been written on the law of fiduciary duties of directors of insolvent companies over the years, this article attempts to add to the existing literature with two focuses. First, it considers the legal concepts from the standpoint of litigation and litigation strategy (as well as board advice), where relevant focusing on bankruptcy court practice. Second, it highlights several developments in the law of fiduciary duties of officers and directors and deepening insolvency that have somewhat changed the landscape in the past several years.

Indeed, the changes have been significant, mostly because in the last several years the Delaware state courts have had before them a handful of cases that have enabled them to consider issues that previously were mostly being litigated in bankruptcy courts. For the better part of 15 years in the 1990s and early 2000s, after the Delaware Court of Chancery’s famous decision in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., bankruptcy trustees and creditors committees routinely asserted claims that directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties to creditors while the corporation was in the “zone of insolvency.” As shown below, the concepts of a “zone of insolvency” (as opposed to actual

6. See infra Part II.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2014); In re Cooper Commons LLC, 512 F.3d 533, 535–36 (9th Cir. 2008).
9. See In re Cooper Commons, 512 F.3d at 535–36 (explaining that a suit may be funded by the lenders collateral, thus the individual creditors must not fund litigation); Jackson, supra note 7, at 859–71.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
15. Id. at *108.
insolvency) and of duties being owed directly to creditors have been rejected in the last few years. These changes must be considered by plaintiffs in the way they frame complaints, and by defendants in determining whether they have a valid motion to dismiss the complaint. Similarly, until approximately 2006, the concept of “deepening insolvency” had been gaining “growing acceptance.” But after the Delaware Court of Chancery’s *Trenwick* opinion, that trend has reversed. Still, some bankruptcy courts believe that certain states would consider deepening insolvency as a cause of action, and many courts have considered deepening insolvency to be a valid damages theory.

Another significant area of recent change is the Delaware Court of Chancery’s November 2010 pronouncement that creditors of an insolvent limited liability company (“LLC”) cannot obtain standing—even derivative standing—to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. This, of course, makes LLCs (and limited partnerships) different in this respect than corporations, and as shown below, raises questions about the pursuit of claims in a bankruptcy case when the debtor is an LLC or a limited partnership (“LP”). More recently, cases such as *Quadrant* have grappled with a topic of significance to many companies that wind up in Chapter 11 cases: to what extent can a board that is controlled by an equity holder choose an aggressive business strategy designed to maximize a return to equity holders which puts creditor recovery at risk. Understanding these and other new developments is vital to crafting a complaint that survives a motion to dismiss and to defending such a suit.

These concepts are considered in more detail below, after a background on fiduciary duty law which sets the foundation for how these concepts differ—or do not differ—with respect to insolvent companies.

**I. Fiduciary Duties of Directors Generally**

The concept of fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors stems back to older trust law: the law imposes fiduciary duties upon those who control property

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16. See infra Part II.C.
22. See infra Part III.C.
24. See infra Part II.
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for the benefit of another. Thus, directors and officers of corporations, who are entrusted with overseeing and managing the business affairs of the corporation for its stockholder owners, owe fiduciary duties to stockholders. As set forth below in Section F, in Delaware and many other states, directors and officers of solvent corporations owe fiduciary duties only to stockholders, but some states have a “constituency statute,” allowing directors to consider the interest of other constituencies as well. Thus, when pursuing a claim in bankruptcy court, it is vital to understand which state’s law applies to the claim.

The so called “triad” of fiduciary duties are the duties of loyalty, care, and good faith (the last of which might not be its own duty, as set forth in Section C below). In most cases, directors are entitled to judicial deference for their business decisions and also are shielded from personal liability by the so-called “business judgment rule.” As explained below, the prerequisite for invoking the rule is a business decision made in the absence of potentially conflicting personal interests, with care, and in good faith.

A. Duty of Care

The duty of care requires a director in managing the corporation’s affairs to exercise the degree of care that an “ordinarily careful and prudent [person] would use in similar circumstances.” The duty of care arises primarily in two scenarios. First, prior to making a business decision, directors must call forth and consider material information reasonably available to them. Second, directors also have a duty to

27. See infra Part IL.F. In large measure, this article focuses on Delaware law for three reasons: (a) a large percentage of corporations are incorporated in Delaware, so its law has increased importance; (b) it has by far the most extensive, well developed body of case law on these subjects; and (c) largely due to (a) and (b), many courts in other states view Delaware case law to be persuasive on these issues. See, e.g., Emprise Bank v. Rumisek, 215 P.3d 621, 632 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (“Because Kansas corporate indemnity law is modeled after Delaware’s law on the subject, . . . we look to Delaware for guidance.”); Beard v. Love, 173 P.3d 796, 802 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (“Because the Oklahoma General Corporation Act is based on the Delaware Act, decisions of the Delaware Courts are very persuasive.” (citations omitted)).
30. See infra Part II.C.
32. See infra Part II.D.
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.

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exercise care in overseeing and investigating the conduct of corporate employees, often referred to as the “duty of oversight.” Liability for breach of the duty of oversight may be imposed if either “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”

B. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty prohibits a corporate director from engaging in self-dealing or usurping corporate opportunities in the performance of his or her duties as a director. Material financial interests held by a director that conflict with or are potentially in conflict with the interest of the company directly implicate this duty.

C. Duty of Good Faith
Traditionally, Delaware case law referred to good faith as the third of the “triad” of fiduciary duties. More recently, however, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that “the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.” That opinion settled a long-running academic debate, but likely has little practical effect on a board’s deliberations and fiduciary duty litigation, since directors still must act in good faith in discharging their duties of care and loyalty. In other words, citing Stone, a bankruptcy court might dismiss a count titled “breach of duty of good faith,” but decline to dismiss a separate count called “breach of duty of loyalty” based on the same conduct; the dismissal of the good faith count likely will have little or no impact on the rest of the litigation.

Additionally, directors may not act in a manner such that they “knew that they were making material decisions without adequate information and without

37. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (finding that corporate directors’ fiduciary duty “requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation [and] demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest”).
40. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.

D. The Business Judgment Rule

The business judgment rule is a series of judicially created “presumption[s] that directors are acting independently, in good faith and with due care in making a business decision.” Indeed, it is an “elementary precept of corporation law . . . [that] in the absence of facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate officer or director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that may be suffered as a result of a decision that an officer made or that directors authorized in good faith.” This is the case even where the court believes that the board’s decision, in hindsight, is “substantively wrong, . . . ‘stupid,’ . . . ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational.’”

The business judgment rule can be rebutted by a showing of a breach of the duty of care, loyalty, or good faith. Once the business judgment rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the directors to prove the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation. The shifting of the burden can often be outcome determinative because that burden is so difficult (but not impossible) to meet. Thus, litigation often centers on the issue of whether the business judgment rule has been rebutted. For example, an entire body of case law examines whether a director is “interested” in a transaction due to a financial interest in it, or because a director is “beholden” to other interested directors, either though familial relationships or because the director’s financial fortunes are tied in some way (salary and continued employment for an inside director, substantial director, consulting or other fees for others) to the interested director.

In insolvency litigation, the plaintiff will often attempt to plead around the business judgment rule by alleging that a director was a large stockholder (or a designee of a large stockholder, such as an employee of a private equity firm that is a

41. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); accord In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 735 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
46. Id. at 361. See also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 271 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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majority stockholder of the debtor) and chose a business strategy that favored stockholders at the expense of creditors. This type of allegation has had mixed success—some courts have accepted this theory while others have rejected it.\textsuperscript{50} Ultimately, it might well be that the distinction turns on the facts of the case.

\textit{E. Pleading Standards Concerning the Business Judgment Rule Differ in State and Federal Courts}

Interestingly, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the standard for determining whether the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the business judgment rule differs between federal courts (including bankruptcy courts) on the one hand and the Delaware Court of Chancery on the other, even though their respective versions of Rule 8 are substantially similar. Delaware courts require plaintiffs to plead “with particularity facts showing that the challenged decision was not the result of a valid business judgment.”\textsuperscript{51} In contrast, Federal courts only require the plaintiff to “make out a claim upon which relief can be granted,” i.e., notice pleading, recognizing that “[i]f more facts are necessary to resolve or clarify the disputed issues, the parties may avail themselves of the civil discovery mechanisms under the Federal Rules.”\textsuperscript{52} Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Delaware’s stricter pleading standard when the business judgment rule is in play does not apply in federal courts, even when the federal court considers a motion to dismiss a complaint that implicates Delaware’s business judgment rule.\textsuperscript{53} While this standard has been criticized as altering substantive state law,\textsuperscript{54} several courts have adopted the Third Circuit’s approach and apply federal pleading standards to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Compare \textit{In re Radnor Holdings Corp.}, 553 B.R. 820, 845 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (finding that the business judgment rule was not rebutted despite directors’ large stockholdings), \textit{with In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del.}, 327 B.R. 537, 550 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005), aff’d, 278 Fed. Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2008). The most recent and perhaps most interesting opinions addressing this subject, the \textit{Quadrant} opinions, apply the entire fairness standard when the controlling stockholder caused the corporation to enter into transactions with the controlling stockholder, but the business judgment rule when the controlled board makes business decisions that, while characterized as risky and standing to benefit only shareholders, have some rational basis of increasing firm value. \textit{See Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin}, 102 A.3d 155, 185, 187–88 (Del. Ch. 2014); \textit{Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin}, C.A. No. 6990–VCL, 2014 WL 5465535, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{51} \textit{See In re Tower Air, Inc.}, 416 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Id.} at 237 (quoting Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{See id.} at 232.
\item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{See IT Grp., Inc. v. D’Aniello}, No. 04-1268-KAI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27369, at *30, *33 n.10 (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2005) (noting that Delaware’s pleading requirements for breach of fiduciary duty claims are “an entirely deliberate decision of substantive Delaware law” rather than mere procedure, and finding that applying federal pleading standards to such claims “change[s] the scope of Delaware fiduciary duty claims by weakening a substantive presumption”). It should be noted that the District Court judge who authored the \textit{IT Grp.} opinion subsequently was elevated to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
\end{itemize}
determine whether a plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the business judgment rule.\(^5\)

However, it is not necessarily easier for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss a fiduciary duty claim in Federal court as opposed to the Delaware state courts. After all, in Federal courts, plaintiffs must assure compliance with the recent Supreme Court pronouncements of *Twombly*\(^5\) and *Iqbal*,\(^7\) which in some sense raise federal pleading standards by requiring a “plausible” basis for the relief sought. The Delaware Supreme Court has rejected the *Twombly/Iqbal* “plausibility” standard for cases filed in Delaware state courts.\(^8\) Thus, an odd dichotomy exists: a plaintiff choosing to file a fiduciary duty suit in Delaware state court need not meet the plausibility standard, but does need to plead with particularity why the business judgment rule is rebutted, while a plaintiff choosing to file in Federal court has the opposite burden.

As set forth below, the business judgment rule continues to operate with full force (and may be rebutted upon the same showing) when the plaintiff is a trustee, creditors committee, or creditor, and the allegation is a breach of fiduciary duty to the insolvent enterprise.\(^9\)

### F. Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in a Solvent Corporation

A director of a solvent corporation owes fiduciary obligations to the corporation itself.\(^\text{60}\) Those same fiduciary obligations extend to the corporation’s stockholders because, as owners of the business enterprise, they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s growth and increased value.\(^\text{61}\) In many states, including Delaware, directors of a solvent corporation owe no fiduciary obligation to the corporation’s

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\(^7\) Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).


\(^9\) See *infra* Part III.A.

\(^60\) See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).

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Courts in these states have rejected efforts to expand the fiduciary obligations of directors of solvent corporations to creditors, finding that a creditor’s rights are fixed by contract with the corporation. Delaware courts have emphasized that “creditors are usually better able to protect themselves than dispersed shareholders.” Indeed, in Delaware, favoring a creditor over a stockholder of a solvent corporation (absent a legal obligation to do so) may constitute a breach of the director’s fiduciary obligation.

However, thirty-two states currently have “constituency statutes.” These statutes largely were adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s in response to holdings like Revlon that, when faced with takeover overtures or similar decisions, directors (of solvent companies) only were permitted to consider what was in the best interests of stockholders, rather than what is in the best interests of, for example, the community in which the corporation has its principal operations, creditors, employees, retired employees and beneficiaries or the environment. Typical constituency statutes permit, but do not require, directors to consider such constituencies in addition to the interests of stockholders in making business decisions.

II. Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a Troubled Corporation

A. Duty Owed to the Corporation as a Whole

When a corporation becomes insolvent, directors continue to owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation as a whole. However, unlike for a solvent corporation, what is in the best interests of an insolvent corporation might not be what is in the best

62. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (“Before a fiduciary duty arises, an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist.”); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (explaining that duties to creditors of solvent company are contractual, rather than fiduciary, in nature); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 947 (Del. Ch. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 875 A.2d 632 (Del. 2005) (“The general rule is that the directors of a debtor company do not owe the creditors any duty beyond the relevant contractual terms.” (citations omitted)).


65. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–84.


68. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2003).

69. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b).
interests of stockholders.\textsuperscript{70} Until recently, Delaware cases often stated that, upon insolvency, the class of constituencies to whom directors owe duties expands to include creditors.\textsuperscript{71} As detailed below, more recent cases dispelled the notion of duties being owed directly to creditors, but nevertheless continue to acknowledge that upon and after insolvency, creditor interests matter.\textsuperscript{72}

B. Why Insolvency Effects the Analysis

One rationale for considering creditors’ interests upon insolvency is the “trust fund” theory, which analogizes that the directors of an insolvent company hold the company’s assets in trust for the benefit of creditors.\textsuperscript{73} This “strand of authority [is] . . . by no means universally praised . . .”.\textsuperscript{74} Among other things, the theory better explains why self-dealing transactions may be wrongful upon insolvency than in providing a basis to consider creditors’ interests in ordinary third party transactions.\textsuperscript{75} Arguably, the Delaware Court of Chancery has now expressly rejected the trust fund doctrine.\textsuperscript{76} A second rationale, the “at risk” theory, contemplates that as a corporation approaches insolvency, corporate directors may adopt inappropriately high-risk strategies to save value for stockholders.\textsuperscript{77} In doing


\textsuperscript{71} Certain bankruptcy courts or courts in other states interpreted this to mean that a “shift” occurred such that corporate directors no longer owe a fiduciary duty to stockholders upon insolvency. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1982). That interpretation was not a correct statement of Delaware law. See Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172–73 (Del. Ch. 2014) (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court’s Bovay opinion “could be interpreted” to have provided for such a shift). Rather, pre-Gheewalla Delaware decisions held that upon insolvency, directors’ fiduciary duties expand to include both creditors and stockholders. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992). Indeed, the Chancery Court has stated that “[w]hile it is true that a board of directors of an insolvent corporation or one operating in the vicinity of insolvency has fiduciary duties to creditors and others as well as to its stockholders, it is not true that our law countenances, permits, or requires directors to conduct the affairs of an insolvent corporation in a manner that is inconsistent with principles of fairness or in breach of duties owed to the stockholders.” Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. CIV.A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002).

\textsuperscript{72} See infra Part II.C.


\textsuperscript{74} See infra Part II.C.


\textsuperscript{76} See Quadrant, 102 A.3d at 185 (characterizing the count of the complaint which it dismissed as “[i]n effect . . . assert[ing] a variant of Bovay’s trust fund doctrine” and holding that the count “does not state a claim”).

so, directors may put creditors, who at that point likely are the true residual claimants to and beneficiaries of the corporation, at risk if they were solely charged with maximizing value for stockholders. Delaware law holds that a board is “ordinarily . . . free to take economic risk for the benefit of the firm’s equity owners, so long as the directors comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting and pursuing with fidelity and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm’s value.” Of course, what constitutes a plausible strategy itself also turns on the facts and can be a subject of disagreement, as the *Quadrant* case, discussed below, aptly demonstrates.

C. The Origin and Demise of the “Zone of Insolvency” and the Concept of Duties Being Owed Directly to Creditors

The *Credit Lyonnais* court stated in a footnote that when operating a solvent company

> in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.

The court concluded that “[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”

Many courts and commentators read this footnote to hold that creditors affirmatively have the right to enforce fiduciary duties owed to them by filing suit against directors and officers, as long as the company is in the so-called “zone of insolvency.” This led to a multitude of complaints—mostly filed in bankruptcy courts—by creditors committees, litigation trusts and trustees, against directors for

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80. *See infra* Parts II.D–E.


82. *Id.* at 1155 n.55.

83. *Id.* at 1155.

84. *See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Reliance Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.),* 178 B.R. 956, 968–69 (D. Del. 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss because a complaint alleged that even if the company was not insolvent, it was at least in the zone of insolvency).
breach of fiduciary duties for alleged failure to prefer the interests of creditors over stockholders of troubled, but arguably solvent, companies.\(^8\)

In *Production Resources*,\(^8\) the Delaware Court of Chancery called into question whether *Credit Lyonnais* actually provided a mechanism for creditor recoveries.\(^7\) The court stated that "*Credit Lyonnais* provided a shield to directors from stockholders who claimed that the directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk so long as the company would not technically breach any legal obligations."\(^8\) This shield helps creditors because "directors, it can be presumed, generally take seriously the company’s duty to pay its bills as a first priority."\(^8\) The court stated that the cases that "somewhat oddly . . . read *Credit Lyonnais* as creating a new body of creditor’s rights law . . . [are] not unproblematic."\(^8\) After noting several theoretical problems with imposing on directors fiduciary duties to creditors of not-yet insolvent corporations, the court concluded that it “doubt[ed] the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-guess good-faith director conduct in the so-called zone.”\(^8\) *Production Resources*, however, did not state that the *zone of insolvency* has become irrelevant. Indeed, the court, by explaining its prior holding in *Credit Lyonnais*, reaffirmed that directors and officers *are permitted* (but not required) to take into account the interests of creditors, as well as stockholders, when determining what is in the corporation’s best interests once a company has entered the *zone of insolvency*—a significant change from the primary tasks of officers and directors when a company is financially healthy.\(^8\) That change was intended to reflect a “shield” to protect directors against suits by stockholders, as contemplated by *Credit Lyonnais*.\(^8\) Additionally, the *Production Resources* opinion notes that “once a firm becomes insolvent, there is little doubt that creditors can press derivative claims arguing that directors’ *pre-insolvency* conduct injured the firm.”\(^8\)

Three years after *Production Resources* was decided, the Delaware Supreme Court in *North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla*\(^9\) stated:

When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.  

While the quotation is dictum, it suggests that under Gheewalla, a creditor of a marginally solvent Delaware corporation operating in the zone of insolvency may not bring a direct or derivative suit for breach of fiduciary duty. Courts in other states have followed suit. For example, in Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle, the California Court of Appeals held that “there is no fiduciary duty prescribed under California law that is owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue of its operating in the ‘zone’ or ‘vicinity’ of insolvency.”

While the Gheewalla court was not presented with the issue of whether the board could use the zone of insolvency as a “shield” against stockholder suits if the board determined to favor a course of action preferred by creditors, its “for the benefit of its stockholder owners” language has created some confusion as to whether the “shield” of the zone of insolvency remains viable. The zone of insolvency could still be a relevant concept if it still permits the “shield.” Especially after the Quadrant opinion, litigators might be better served by framing these types of issues in terms of what the business judgment rule does and does not permit, rather than whether a shield is available to protect one set of interests over another.

Despite this case law, the zone of insolvency cannot be entirely ignored because some opinions (especially outside of Delaware state courts) issued after Production Resources have continued to emphasize the zone of insolvency. Now that Gheewalla has had more time to be understood and digested by the legal community, however, the distinction between merely being financially troubled as

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96. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 101–03.
99. Id.
100. See Russell Silberglied & Jonathan P. Friedland, Did the Delaware Supreme Court Break the ‘Directors’ Shield?’, 24 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1, 1 (2007).
101. Decision making in the zone also cannot ignore creditors’ interests—whether a duty exists at that moment or not—because “once a firm becomes insolvent, there is little doubt that creditors [or a trustee or creditors committee] can press derivative claims arguing that directors’ pre-insolvency conduct injured the firm.” Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789 n.56 (Del. Ch. 2004) (emphasis added). This rule has developed because “if creditors lack standing to assert claims that pre-date the point of insolvency, then the number of possible plaintiffs will be few: stockholders will lack the incentive, and creditors will lack the standing.” Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 180 (Del. Ch. 2014).
102. See, e.g., In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 327 B.R. 537, 548 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (denying a motion for summary judgment and stating that the plaintiff could recover at trial if it met its burden of proving “that Hechinger was operating in the vicinity of insolvency” at the time of the alleged misconduct).
opposed to insolvent has come into focus. In one recent opinion, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss a complaint which alleged that the defendant’s “misconduct propelled the Debtors into insolvency, which ultimately led to the filing of its bankruptcy cases” some time later.\footnote{103} That allegation amounted to an admission that the company was not insolvent at the time of the alleged misconduct and did not become insolvent immediately upon the occurrence of the alleged misconduct, so it did not suffice to confer standing under \textit{Gheewalla}.

\textit{Gheewalla} separately confirmed that upon \textit{actual} insolvency, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation itself.\footnote{105} The \textit{Gheewalla} court recognized that upon insolvency, what is in the best interests of the corporation often departs from what is in the best interests of stockholders, noting that “[w]hen a corporation is insolvent . . . its creditors take the place of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value.”\footnote{106} Thus, the directors’ duty is “to maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it”—whether creditors or stockholders.\footnote{107} A breach of that duty may be enforced by a creditor (or presumably a creditors committee) with derivative standing, but not by a direct claim.\footnote{109} In other words, a creditor, as among the class of residual beneficiaries, can derivatively enforce the directors’ duties to the company, but there is no duty owed directly to any individual creditor.

Similarly, the Court of Chancery has confirmed that there is no duty to “do what was best for a particular class of . . . creditors.”\footnote{110} That guidance is helpful because language in certain case law discussing the “interests of creditors” oversimplifies the situation facing most boards of insolvent companies—that they have at least one if not more classes of secured debt as well as unsecured trade debt, and the holders of each tranche of debt have very different—sometimes directly adverse—interests and goals. Of course, the quoted language from \textit{Shandler v. DLJ Merchant Banking}
only refers to fiduciary duties of the board, but the board still must comply with other provisions of the law, which in a Chapter 11 case of course includes the absolute priority rule.

The parties must consider the distinctions described in the preceding paragraphs when framing a complaint or presenting a defense; describing the fiduciary duty as being owed to the wrong class or person can result in case dismissal. However, it is not clear whether these distinctions make a practical difference to a board of directors that is considering a variety of business decisions: whether the directors should act in the best interests of creditors as a whole, or in the best interest of the company—the residual beneficiaries of which are creditors, probably makes little difference in most instances.

In Berg & Berg, the California Court of Appeals similarly confirmed that directors of an insolvent California corporation owe duties to the corporation. The court declined to create a “broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or loyalty that directors of an insolvent corporation owe to the corporation’s creditors solely because of a state of insolvency.” However, it did leave open the door for a limited class of such claims:

*We accordingly hold that the scope of any extra-contractual duty owed by corporate directors to the insolvent corporation’s creditors is limited in California, consistent with the trust-fund doctrine, to the avoidance of actions that divert, dissipate or unduly risk corporate assets that might otherwise be used to pay creditors claims. This would include acts that involve self-dealing or the preferential treatment of creditors.*

111. See id.
114. The Gheewalla court was concerned about the board’s ability to negotiate with a particular creditor, and whether owing fiduciary duties to creditors would interfere with the ability to negotiate. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103. It is not clear that conceptualizing fiduciary duties as being owed to the creditor body as a whole would interfere with a board’s ability to negotiate with one particular creditor.
115. Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (declining to adopt a “broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or loyalty” owing to creditors in part because doing so would conflict with and dilute the statutory and common law duties that directors already owe to shareholders and the corporation” (emphasis added)).
116. Id.
117. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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The Berg & Berg court did not specify whether such claims are direct or derivative, but since it phrased the duty as being owed “to the insolvent corporation’s creditors,” it appears that a limited set of direct claims are envisioned in California, unlike in Delaware.\(^\text{118}\) In contrast, the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted Gheewalla in full, so creditors of insolvent Tennessee corporations may only bring derivative claims.\(^\text{119}\)

Because Gheewalla suggests that derivative claims are not available to creditors of solvent companies operating in the zone, but such claims are available to creditors of insolvent companies, and Berg & Berg likewise permits limited fiduciary duty claims upon insolvency but not in the zone, the key question has shifted from whether the company is close to insolvent (i.e., in the “zone”) to whether it is insolvent in fact.\(^\text{120}\) That is not an easy question to answer, since often post-hoc valuations will differ by wide margins.\(^\text{121}\) The former chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court advises that a board “need[s] the best financial and legal advice obtainable in order to determine on which side of the solvency line the corporation is sitting.”\(^\text{122}\)

D. Balancing Competing Interests of the Various Constituencies

Directors and officers of an insolvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation as a whole, and prudence dictates that they must consider the interests of creditors as well as stockholders in determining what is in the corporation’s best interests.\(^\text{123}\) That often creates tension. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court’s directive to “maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it”\(^\text{124}\) to a certain degree begs the question: long term value or short term value? For example, efforts to maximize the corporation’s

118. Id.
120. See Silberglied & Friedland, supra note 100, at 1–3; see also In re Tropicana Entm’l, LLC, 520 B.R. 455, 471 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) (dismissing a complaint because it only alleged that actions “propelled the debtors into insolvency” some time later, not that the debtors were insolvent at the time); Burch v. Huston (In re US Digital, Inc.), 443 B.R. 22, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“[T]he Director Defendants cannot have breached their fiduciary duty to US Digital and its creditors while operating in the ‘zone of insolvency’ because they did not owe such a duty under Delaware law. However, as Gheewalla makes clear, when US Digital became insolvent, the Director Defendants owed fiduciary duties to US Digital and its creditors.”).
121. See Silberglied & Friedland, supra note 100, at 3; see also Berg & Berg, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1022 (recognizing the “practical problems with creating [a broad duty to creditors], among them a director’s ability to objectively and concretely determine when a state of insolvency actually exists such that his or her duties to creditors have been triggered”).
122. E. Norman Veasey, Former Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court, Presentation at the American College of Bankruptcy Conference: Counseling the Board of Directors of the Company in Distress 15 (Mar. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
ability to pay its debts may, in some instances, conflict with maximizing the long
term value of the company, and thus the value of the stockholders’ interest in the
corporation (e.g., by using current cash flow to make investments for future
growth). 125 Therefore, directors of a financially troubled company often walk a fine
line to strike a balance between the interests of creditors and those of stockholders,
or between various classes of creditors, and litigation often involves after-the-fact
second guessing of that balance.

When presented with such conflicting interests among constituents, the directors
should “choose a course of action that best serves the entire corporate enterprise
rather than any single group interested in the corporation.” 127 What that means in a
given case turns on the facts of the case, but it is important to understand that non-
conflicted decisions based on adequate information usually are not second guessed
by courts merely because the directors chose a course of action that one set of
stakeholders did not favor. 128 In this respect, a court’s review of directors’ choices of
what actions to take upon insolvency would be approached no differently than a
court’s review of any other business decision of a solvent or insolvent company—
the business judgment rule applies unless it has been rebutted, which can be
achieved by showing that the decision was a product of gross negligence or self-
interest. 129 Indeed, the Gheewalla court’s holding that directors can choose to take
on risk if they select a “plausible strategy” is consistent with a gross negligence
standard of review. 130

Consequently, the Delaware Court of Chancery has held that directors did not
breach their fiduciary duties to stockholders in allowing a creditor, who agreed
voluntarily to pay off the company’s unsecured creditors, to foreclose on the
debtors’ property, because the directors “reasonably believed that a bankruptcy
filing[,] which was the option advocated by the stockholders[,] would produce
negative returns for all . . . constituencies, including its stockholders.” 131 Similarly,
the Court of Chancery held that directors did not breach their fiduciary duties to
stockholders in selling operating assets for less than the amount of the company’s
debt, ensuring no return to equity, because there was no competing bidder and the
company’s cash flow crisis would have imminently resulted in a bankruptcy filing. 132

Applying Delaware law, a New York court likewise held that Bear Stearns’ directors

126. This is one reason why the business judgment rule is so important in this context. See infra Part II.E.
128. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007);
129. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
130. See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 100.
did not breach their fiduciary duties to stockholders in selling to JP Morgan at a low price, in part, because other alternatives would have been risky to creditors, the company was insolvent or nearly insolvent, and creditors likely would not have recovered anything in a bankruptcy case.  

There are, of course, some notable exceptions. For example, in *Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.*, 134 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board breached its fiduciary duties by agreeing to a lock-up and a no-shop provision in a merger agreement with a no “fiduciary out” clause with Genesis, thereby ultimately resulting in the board recommending a merger to stockholders that turned out to be at a lower price than a later emerging, competing offer that provided more for stockholders. 135 The company was insolvent and previous offers made by the competing offeror, Omnicare, had involved bankruptcy sales. 136 Genesis instead offered a going-concern sale outside of bankruptcy court but insisted upon the merger agreement containing no “fiduciary out” clause. 137 In approving the Genesis deal, the board concluded that the risk of loss of this deal if the board insisted on a fiduciary out (which Genesis was unwilling to give)—and thereby possibly having no deal and risking the ability to pay creditors—was not warranted when weighed against the uncertainty of ever receiving a possibly superior proposal. 138 Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the board was required to contract for an effective “fiduciary out” clause in order to exercise its continuing fiduciary duties to minority stockholders. 139

While some were surprised by *Omnicare*, there is no requirement to favor the interests of creditors (or preferred stockholders) 140 over common stockholders solely because the company is on the brink of insolvency. 141 Rather, the board is entitled to choose a range of options, so long as the board acts in good faith and in an informed manner. 142 Perhaps the most vivid example of this is the recent *Quadrant* opinion. The company was insolvent, had ceased operations, and its only remaining
activity was investing its securities. The plaintiff/creditor alleged that the board, dominated by interested directors, re-invested the funds into riskier securities, thereby jeopardizing creditor recoveries and solely benefiting the out-of-the-money stockholders, who hoped the riskier investments would pan out and provide a return to equity. The court held that unless the business judgment rule was rebutted—and it held that it was not—this theory did not state a claim.

While Quadrant demonstrates that directors—even ones who benefit from risk taking—can win litigation by raising such claims, excessive risk taking might not be advisable for directors of troubled companies. As the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has written, “directorial focus on the best interests of corporate viability and a skeptical view of the wisdom of aggressive risk-taking would seem to be the best advice for fiduciaries of a corporation that is close to the line.” Two other considerations should be noted. First, while the Quadrant opinion dismissed the counts relating to risky investment strategy, it denied a motion to dismiss several counts alleging that the company’s direct transactions with insiders were not entirely fair. Second, just because an action might be permissible as a matter of fiduciary duty law does not necessarily make it advisable or immune from a different cause of action. For example, upon insolvency or earlier under the “unreasonably small capital” test, risky transactions can be second guessed as fraudulent transfers, and a company risks violations of covenants in loan documents or bond indentures.

E. The Business Judgment Rule in Creditor Cases

Gheewalla confirms that the nature of fiduciary duties does not change upon insolvency. Rather, as described above, the identity of the constituencies who benefit from those duties simply change. Accordingly, “[t]he debtor has a duty to use reasonable care in making decisions but once those decisions are made, the debtor is protected by the business judgment rule.” Thus, regardless of the identity of the person or entity which files suit—stockholder or creditor—the business decisions of the directors of an insolvent corporation are given the same degree of judicial deference as business decisions of the directors of solvent

144. Id. at 168–69.
145. See infra Part II.E.
146. Quadrant, 102 A.3d at 192.
147. Veasey, supra note 122, at 15.
148. Quadrant, 102 A.3d at 166.
150. See id. at 103.
151. Veasey, supra note 122, at 15.
companies. Because the fact of insolvency does not change the primary object of
the directors’ duties, which is the firm itself, the business judgment rule remains
important and provides directors with the ability to make a range of good faith,
prudent judgments about the risks they should undertake on behalf of troubled
firms. Thus, “even when [a company is] insolvent, the board [is] entitled to
exercise a good faith business judgment to continue to operate the business if it
believed that was what would maximize . . . value.”

While the application of the business judgment rule ensures that courts will not
second guess business decisions of a disinterested board of directors acting in an
informed manner and in good faith, creditors nevertheless can prove liability in
the same manner as can stockholders of a Delaware corporation who seek to rebut
the business judgment rule. One popular theory in many complaints argues that
the board’s decisions were conflicted and improperly colored by consideration of
one or more directors’ equity ownership interests. This theory has been met with
mixed success. For example, in Hechinger, the court held that the business
judgment rule had been rebutted for purposes of a motion for summary judgment
by allegations that the board favored the interests of equity over creditors because
certain board members owned 65% of the company’s outstanding voting stock.
In contrast, in Radnor, a post-trial opinion, the court applied the business judgment
rule to the directors’ decision to take on more debt to fund a new project over
allegations that the board was “swinging for the fences” due to its members’
ownership of nearly all of the company’s common equity—in other words, an
allegation that the board was willing to risk creditor recoveries in the hopes that the
new business venture would make the company return to solvency and provide value to the stockholders (i.e. the directors themselves). 160

Quadrant raises the point most directly. The insolvent company already ceased its operating business, and was left with securities that were required under its operating guidelines to be invested in AAA rated investments. 161 An acquirer bought the equity of the company at a discount, controlled the board, and implemented a plan to change the governing documents to permit riskier investments. 162 A bondholder sued under a Gheewalla theory, and argued that the business judgment rule did not apply because the only beneficiary of the decision to make riskier investments was the equity holder who controlled the board; 163 after all, equity was out of the money, so if the risky investments did not pan out, the equity holder lost nothing. The court rejected this theory, holding:

I do not believe that Quadrant can rebut the business judgment rule by alleging that the Board has decided to pursue a relatively more risky business strategy to benefit its sole common stockholder, EBF. Although the Company is insolvent, and although the directors are dual-fiduciaries, the Board does not face a conflict between the interest of the primary residual claimants (the creditors) and the interests of the secondary residual claimants (the stockholders). 164

From a litigation standpoint, the court provided guidance on what must be pleaded and later proved to rebut the business judgment rule in this context:

It is not enough, however, for a plaintiff simply to argue in the abstract that a particular director has a conflict of interest or is acting in bad faith because she is affiliated with a particular type of institution that may be pursuing a particular business strategy or have a particular interest. There must be specific allegations and later, actual evidence sufficient to permit a finding that the director faced a conflict or acted with an improper purpose on the facts of the case. 165

While there is no post-Gheewalla (or for that matter, post-Credit Lyonnais) opinion addressing the subject, an interesting issue is whether the business judgment rule could also be rebutted on an allegation that the directors breached

160. Id. at 843.
162. Id. at 169.
163. Id. at 172.
164. Id. at 192.
165. Id. at 189.
their duty of care by not informing themselves as to whether the company was insolvent and therefore erroneously operating as if their duties were solely to the stockholders. Cases from other contexts demonstrate that directors should be mindful of the issue.\footnote{166}

**F. Determination of Insolvency**

As set forth above, under Delaware law, the fiduciary duty to the corporation requires the consideration of more than just stockholders upon insolvency, and under California law a limited fiduciary duty is owed to creditors upon insolvency.\footnote{167} Thus, determining when a corporation has become insolvent is the starting point of analyzing the fiduciary responsibilities of directors of a financially troubled company.

Determining what constitutes insolvency is a subject on which entire articles have been written, and thus extends beyond the scope of this article.\footnote{168} For present purposes, it is important to note that there are two standard measures of insolvency: the balance sheet test and “equitable insolvency.” Under Delaware law, a company is insolvent if it fails either test.\footnote{169} Thus, when determining whether a director’s expanded fiduciary duties are triggered, both tests should be considered.\footnote{170} Moreover, even though the balance sheet test is a “misnomer” and the balance sheet is only the “starting point” of that test,\footnote{171} if the company’s balance sheet on its face reflects insolvency, a court is very unlikely to grant a motion to

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\footnote{166. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding fraud because, when the company was on the brink of insolvency and a duty might be owed to creditors, a director paid a commission to himself “at a time when he knew or should have known the condition of the corporation”); United States v. Spitzer, 261 F. Supp. 754, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (noting that any director, officer, or stockholder who controls the affairs of the corporation is assumed to be aware of all outstanding claims against the debtor and can be held liable for failure to inform himself or herself of such claims or acting in disregard of such information); see also In re USDigital, Inc., 443 B.R. 22, 46 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“The Trustee has also alleged sufficient facts indicating that the Director Defendants lacked good faith in their decision to spin-off Infinidi Media and without considering the effect the spin-off would have on the creditors of USDigital.”).

167. See supra Part II.


169. Id. at 177.


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dismiss a complaint where the board attempts to argue that duties were owed only to the stockholders.172

III. Special Issues in Fiduciary Duty Claims

A. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries

Directors of solvent, wholly owned Delaware subsidiaries owe their fiduciary duties exclusively to the parent.173 Thus, the board of a solvent, wholly owned subsidiary company would be justified in “take[ing] action in aid of its parent’s business strategy” as long as that action would not “violate legal obligations owed to others,” even if those actions made the subsidiary “less valuable as an entity.”174

Some courts have read this proposition broadly and held that a subsidiary’s board’s duties do not change if the subsidiary is insolvent; that is, such courts have held that even where the subsidiary is insolvent, the directors of the wholly owned subsidiary should govern the subsidiary solely for the benefit of the parent.175 More recent opinions have rejected this theory.176 Thus, the more prudent approach (and more accepted litigation position) is that directors of an insolvent subsidiary should consider the interests of the subsidiary as a whole (including creditors’ interests), not just the interests of the parent.177 To the extent that they do not, a lawsuit by a creditor, a committee, or a trustee alleging breach of fiduciary duties could survive a motion to dismiss. In addition, in at least one recent case, a court refused to dismiss claims against the parent’s directors who caused the subsidiary to act in ways inimical to the best interests of the subsidiary and its creditors.178

B. Preferred Stock

Most of this article focuses on insolvent companies, where case law provides derivative standing to creditors under the theory that creditors are the residual

beneficiary of an increase in value. For troubled but marginally solvent companies that have preferred stock with a liquidation preference, the residual beneficiary of an increase or decrease in firm value instead could be the preferred stockholders. Bankruptcy practitioners often refer to the level on the corporate capitalization table where the firm’s value runs out as the “fulcrum security.”

In a recent post-trial opinion, *In re Trados*, the Court of Chancery was faced with a company whose fulcrum security was either preferred stock or common stock. The opinion is most noteworthy for its rejection of any notion that preferred stockholders as a tranche were entitled to special protection as the residual beneficiaries of increased value. It held, instead, that preferred stockholders are simply stockholders for purposes of any fiduciary duty analysis, and any rights that were different than the rights afforded to common stockholders were strictly contractual in nature and could not give rise to any additional fiduciary duty.

**C. Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships**

As a general default rule (i.e., if the governing documents are silent on the point), the managers of an LLC and the general partner of an LP owe the same fiduciary duties—care, loyalty, and arguably good faith—as do the directors of a corporation to its shareholders. However, the fiduciary duty analysis for these “alternative entities” differ from corporations in two fundamental ways.

First, a recent Delaware opinion held that creditors of an insolvent Delaware LLC cannot obtain standing to sue derivatively for breach of fiduciary duty. The court held that section 18-1002 of Delaware’s LLC Act limits standing to pursue derivative claims to holders of membership interests in the LLC or their assignees. Creditors are neither, and thus may not obtain derivative standing. The court recognized that this created a distinction between corporations and LLC’s, but held that “[t]o limit creditors to their bargained-for rights and deny them the additional right to sue derivatively on behalf of an insolvent entity comports with the

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179. *Id.*
181. *Id.* at 20.
182. *Id.* at 38–42.
183. *Id.*
contractarian environment created by the LLC Act. The court explained other ways, some unique to LLCs, that creditors may protect themselves without the need to pursue fiduciary duty claims derivatively.

Thus, when a plaintiff considers filing a fiduciary duty claim or defense counsel first starts planning a defense, the first question to ask is whether the debtor is an LP or an LLC. If it is, issues of standing must be analyzed. If the trustee or debtor in possession filed the suit, it is not a “derivative” case; the company, either through its managers (i.e., board) or its court appointed trustee, is simply asserting its own claim. Furthermore, a litigation trust created pursuant to a plan likely may prosecute such a claim without it being considered a derivative claim, if the plan assigned the estate’s claim to the trust.

The analysis differs if the plaintiff is a creditors committee. Leading cases have permitted a creditors committee (or an individual creditor) to pursue claims that otherwise belong to the estate and are controlled by the debtor in possession by granting the committee “derivative” standing to sue on behalf of the estate or debtor. Future cases will undoubtedly consider whether, notwithstanding CML v. Bax, a bankruptcy court has the equitable power to grant such derivative standing to a creditors committee of an LLC or LP debtor—which obviously is not a “member.”

Second, no matter who has standing to sue, the fiduciary duty analysis itself differs for alternative entities because they are creatures of contract, and the broadly permissive statutes enable LLCs and LPs to modify default rules concerning fiduciary duties in the partnership or operating agreement. Thus, the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act permits modifying and even completely eliminating fiduciary duties:

To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be

188. CML, 6. A.3d at 250.
189. Id. at 250–54.
190. Id. at 252.
191. Id.
193. 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011).
195. Id.
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expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.196

Delaware’s LLC Act has a nearly verbatim provision.197 It should be noted that the Uniform Acts, and therefore the LP and LLC acts of most states other than Delaware, permit restriction, but not outright elimination, of fiduciary duties.198

Sometimes, attempts to modify default fiduciary duties can lead to unintended consequences. For example, in General Growth Properties,199 the operating agreement attempted to modify fiduciary duties in aide of making the LLC “bankruptcy remote.”200 Thus, the operating agreement provided: “[t]o the extent permitted by law . . . the Independent Managers shall consider only the interests of the Company, including its respective creditors, in acting or otherwise voting on the matters [including filing for bankruptcy].”201 This language seems to indicate that the parties to the operating agreement contemplated that even if the LLC were solvent, the interests of creditors would be considered in an effort to keep the entity bankruptcy remote (because as a special purpose entity, the LLC would have one main creditor which would not favor a bankruptcy filing). The court held, however, that the provision operated differently because it “also provided, appropriately, that the Independent Managers can act only to the extent permitted by applicable law, which is deemed to be the corporate law of Delaware.”202 Because the LLC was solvent, the court held that under Gheewalla, fiduciary duties were owed only to the stockholder—and not to creditors.203 Thus, the court interpreted the operating agreement in a way that in fact did not alter the default rules of fiduciary duties, notwithstanding the apparent attempt to do so.

Accordingly, when litigating a claim of breach of fiduciary duty involving an LP or an LLC, it is crucial to consult the operating or partnership agreement to determine if default fiduciary duties have been modified or eliminated.

196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2014).
197. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c).
198. Altman & Raju, supra note 184, at 1473.
200. Id. at 49 n.15.
201. Id. at 63.
202. Id. at 64.
203. Id.
D. Choice of Law

This article has focused primarily on Delaware law, even though fiduciary duty issues typically are raised in federal bankruptcy courts.\(^{207}\) Of course, as a gating issue, litigants must be aware of which state’s law applies to the claims alleged. The internal affairs doctrine “requires that the law of the state of incorporation should determine issues relating to internal corporate affairs.”\(^{205}\) "Internal corporate affairs involve those matters which are peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”\(^{206}\) The fiduciary relationship between director, corporation and its constituencies is the *sine qua non* of internal corporate affairs, so the law of the state of incorporation controls fiduciary duty issues.\(^{207}\)

However, occasionally courts apply a different state’s laws. For example, one bankruptcy court opinion held that New Jersey law applied to a direct claim by a creditor against directors of a Delaware corporation for breach of fiduciary duty.\(^{208}\) While this likely was simply an “outlier” opinion, it is worth noting, particularly because the law of other states could—and in *Stanziale*, did—differ from Delaware law as described herein.\(^{209}\)

An issue also occasionally arises over whether any fiduciary based challenge to the post-petition conduct of a board is governed by state or federal common law. While the Bankruptcy Code does not address fiduciary duties, courts have held that debtors in possession (“DIP”) and those who control the DIP have fiduciary duties just as a Chapter 7 or 11 trustee would.\(^{210}\) Several bankruptcy courts have referred to


\(^{206}\) *McDermott*, 531 A.2d at 214. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313 cmt. a (1971).

\(^{207}\) See *In re Teleglobe*, 493 F.3d at 386 ("Under the internal affairs doctrine, anyone controlling a Delaware corporation is subject to Delaware law on fiduciary obligations to the corporation and other relevant stakeholders."); *In re Fedders N. Am., Inc.*, 405 B.R. 527, 539 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) ("[F]ew, if any, claims are more central to a corporation’s internal affairs than those relating to alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by a corporation’s directors and officers."); see also *In re Tronox*, 429 B.R. at 104 (applying the internal corporate affairs doctrine to a charge of breach of fiduciary duty against promoters of a newly incorporated entity).


\(^{209}\) Id.

\(^{210}\) See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985); Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649 (1963); *In re Brook Valley IV*, 347 B.R. 662, 672–73 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) ("The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a debtor in possession, like a chapter 11 trustee, owes the estate and its creditors a general duty of loyalty.") [I]n practice these fiduciary responsibilities fall not upon the inanimate corporation, but upon the officers and managing employees who must conduct the Debtor’s affairs
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this as a separate fiduciary duty imposed on a DIP and its directors, rather than fiduciary duties under state law. But the source of such a separate duty is unclear. Some have pointed to 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a), but that section merely states that a DIP “shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter. . . .” Duties, of course, does not necessarily mean “fiduciary duties,” and the source of the “duties . . . of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter” is Section 1106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which does not mention fiduciary duties.

But while an interesting academic subject, whether a separate “federal” fiduciary duty should attach to directors of a DIP matters little for two reasons. First, the overwhelming percentage of litigation concerns pre-petition conduct of directors, not post-petition conduct. That is hardly surprising, since post-petition transactions outside of the ordinary course of business have to be approved ex ante by the bankruptcy court, so the grounds to second guess such decisions ex post are slim if extant. Indeed, where there is a faithless DIP, the remedy usually is the appointment of a trustee under Section 1112(b) to remove the fiduciary or the appointment of an examiner under Section 1104(c). Second, the majority of courts hold that the fiduciary duties of a DIP are similar or the same as those of an officer and director outside of bankruptcy. Thus, even if there is a distinction between whether federal or state fiduciary duties are owed, the distinction might be without a difference.

It is worth noting that the recently released report of the “American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study Chapter 11 Reform” considered and rejected a proposal to federalize fiduciary duty standards inside of Chapter 11:

under the surveillance of the court.” (internal citations omitted)), aff’d, In re Brook Valley VII, Joint Venture, 496 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2007); Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame), 251 B.R. 367, 373 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (explaining that, “the DIP is a fiduciary for the bankruptcy estate and assumes virtually all of the rights and responsibilities of a bankruptcy trustee”).


212. See, e.g., In re Bame, 251 B.R. at 373 (recognizing that “the exact scope of a DIP’s fiduciary duties is subject to some debate”).

213. 11 U.S.C § 1107(a) (2014).


If the Bankruptcy Code imposed separate duties on a debtor in possession’s directors, officers, or similar managing persons, those duties might differ from the duties owed by those individuals under state law. Although federal preemption principles might resolve such conflicts from a legal perspective, the conflict could cause substantial confusion and uncertainty for directors, officers, and similar managing persons. The Commission agreed that state law adequately governs fiduciary duties and should continue to govern the fiduciary duties of directors, officers, and similar managing persons in bankruptcy. 218

The Report, of course, is not law but a series of recommendations. 219 Nevertheless, it is indicative of the view that the law today neither does nor should provide for preemption.

E. Exculpation

Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware’s General Corporation Law, and statutes of many states modeled on Delaware law, 220 permit a corporation to include in its certificate of incorporation a provision that exculpates its directors from personal liability “to the corporation or its stockholders” for monetary damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of care. 221 Because claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by or on behalf of creditors must be derivative in nature, 222 they are claims of “the corporation” for which the corporation’s directors are exculpated from personal liability to the extent they involve the duty of care. 223 Thus, Section 102(b)(7) and other states’ equivalents provide the same protection from suits filed by creditors, trustees or committees as they do in suits filed by stockholders of a solvent company.

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219. Id. at 2.
224. As set forth above, while the California Court of Appeals did not directly address the issue in Berg & Berg, it appears that the limited fiduciary duty it permitted is a direct claim by creditors, not a derivative claim. See Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). If so, the logic of Production Resources’ Section 102(b)(7) holding would not apply to the application of Cal. Corp. Code § 204(a)(10).
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Claims for violation of the duty of loyalty, or for acts made in bad faith, are not covered by Section 102(b)(7). Moreover, some courts have held that even a duty of care claim should not be dismissed on section 102(b)(7) grounds where duty of loyalty claims are pleaded in the same complaint. There is some disagreement on this point.

Courts often grapple with the issue of what stage of litigation to consider a Section 102(b)(7) exculpation defense. In general, federal courts have declined to consider this defense on a motion to dismiss, because exculpation is an affirmative defense and it is rare that a plaintiff would note such a certificate of incorporation’s provision in its complaint. The Delaware Supreme Court, in contrast, has permitted the consideration of an exculpation clause on a motion to dismiss if the certificate of incorporation is indisputably authentic and the safeguards of Rule 56 are met. Some courts also will look to an exculpation clause in dismissing a duty of care claim that is not “intertwined” with other claims that would survive a motion to dismiss.

IV. Deepening Insolvency

The theory of “deepening insolvency” is closely analogous to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Deepening insolvency is a fairly recently created tort (if it is a tort). It is defined as “an injury to [a debtor’s] corporate property from the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.” The theory posits that the defendant—typically the board, a majority stockholder, a lender, an auditor, or someone else with a “deep pocket”—should have taken action to liquidate or wind down the company and did not; as a result, the company was less valuable at the time it ultimately was shut down, and therefore less money is

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225. See tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).

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available to distribute to creditors than would have been but for the prolongation of the corporate existence.234

Until 2006, deepening insolvency had gained “growing acceptance” in bankruptcy courts.235 However, more recently, federal courts have scaled back deepening insolvency claims.236 Moreover, the Delaware Court of Chancery in Trenwick categorically rejected deepening insolvency as an independent theory for liability against directors, holding that it does not state a cause of action any more than “shallowing profitability” does.237 The court held that an insolvent company may, “with due diligence and good faith, pursue[] a business strategy that it believes will increase the corporation’s value, but that also involves the incurrence of additional debt,” and that in doing so, does not become the guarantor of that strategy’s success.238 Furthermore, “[t]hat the strategy results in continued insolvency and an even more insolvent entity does not in itself give rise to a cause of action. Rather, in such a scenario the directors are protected by the business judgment rule. To conclude otherwise would fundamentally transform Delaware law.”239 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed “on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery.”240

However, this does not mean that defendants may now forget deepening insolvency as a relic of the past, or that plaintiffs will abandon the theory.241 First, certain courts have held deepening insolvency as a proper damages model for an independent tort, such as breach of fiduciary duty.242 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, in CitX,243 that deepening insolvency is not a valid damages model under Pennsylvania law when the underlying cause of action is malpractice, and questioned whether it was a valid model for any cause of action.244 While cases

234. See, e.g., In re CitX Corp., Inc., 448 F.3d 672, 677 (3d Cir. 2006).
236. See, e.g., In re CitX Corp., 448 F.3d at 677 (limiting deepening insolvency to claims of actual fraud and limiting its availability as a damages model); In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353 B.R.820, 849 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as a damages model).
238. Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 205.
239. Id.
243. In re CitX Corp., Inc., 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2006).
244. Id. at 677.
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decided soon after CitX interpreted it as barring deepening insolvency as a measure of damages for any type of claim, the Brown Schools court held that “the Third Circuit’s holding in CitX was that the company’s deepening insolvency was not a viable theory of damages for the particular claim before that Court, a negligence claim for accounting malpractice,” and denied a motion to dismiss because plaintiffs in Brown Schools instead alleged claims for breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover, the Third Circuit later rejected an appellant accounting firm’s argument that the plaintiff’s damages model was impermissible because it referenced the deepening of the company's insolvency. The court determined that even though the plaintiff had mentioned the phrase “deepening insolvency,” its damages model actually was a traditional conception of tort damages. Regardless of label,

\[\text{when a plaintiff brings an action for professional negligence and proves that the defendant's negligent conduct was the proximate cause of a corporation's increased liabilities, decreased fair market value, or lost profits, the plaintiff may recover damages in accordance with state law.}\]

Thus, actual damages proximately caused by wrongdoing are recoverable under a traditional theory of damages, even if they are also damages for a company’s deepened insolvency.

Chait confirms, then, that a company’s deepened insolvency can form the basis of damages in appropriate circumstances if other factors are also present, but that damages cannot be proven simply by pointing to a company’s deepened insolvency, i.e., just by demonstrating that a company is more insolvent after the wrongdoing than it was before. The deepened insolvency does not speak for itself; it must be caused by the wrongdoing and proven under a state law cause of action. Even when there is causation, some opinions have declined to employ a deepening insolvency measure of damages because, at most, the creditors rather than the company itself are damaged by an already insolvent company’s incurrence

247. Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 523 (3d Cir. 2008).
248. Id. at 520, 523.
249. Id. at 520.
250. The converse is also true: without proximate causation, courts are not likely to permit deepening insolvency type damages. See, e.g., In re Maxxis Grp., Inc., No. 03-77243-MGD, 2009 WL 6527594, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2009) (“Mr. Pennington’s damage analysis is more akin to deepening insolvency damages than establishing that damages were proximately caused by the breach, as Georgia law provides.”).
251. Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2008).
252. See id. at 520.
253. Id.
of additional debt or decline in asset value. Such cases posit that because a trustee may only assert the company’s claims but not the claims of creditors, damages to creditors by deepened insolvency are irrelevant. However, other courts have acknowledged that the fact that damages that the company would receive inure to the benefit of creditors should not change the analysis: “Realistically, a corporation is a conduit for its stakeholders, but that does not affect the corporation’s legal rights.”

The law remains unsettled on this point.

Second, litigants need to continue to be aware of deepening insolvency because while Trenwick has proven to be persuasive authority, it is only binding authority where Delaware law applies (or in other states that have adopted Trenwick). Thus, for example, the Third Circuit recently reversed the dismissal of a deepening insolvency cause of action asserted under Pennsylvania law, holding that the complaint indeed stated a claim for deepening insolvency. Four judges of the en banc court concurred in denying a motion for rehearing. However, they emphasized in a written opinion that the rejection was solely for procedural reasons and that “there is a reason to believe that our prediction in Lafferty about the acceptance of deepening insolvency as a cause of action under Pennsylvania law has been undermined and ought to be reconsidered.” It seems that if deepening insolvency charges were leveled at officers and directors, such claims would be governed by the internal affairs doctrine, and therefore Delaware law would apply if the entity was incorporated in Delaware. But where the allegation is made against a lender, auditor, or other deep pocket, presumably a Restatement/most significant relationship conflicts analysis would be performed, which rarely will result in application of Delaware law.

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255. Id. (citing Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416 (1972)).

256. Fehribach v. Ernst & Young LLP, 493 F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2007).


260. Id. at *2–3.

261. See, e.g., Cohain v. Klimley, Nos. 08 Civ. 5047(PGG), 2010 WL 3701362, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010), aff’d, Sissel v. Rehwaldt, 519 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying New York law to deepening insolvency claim against directors and officers because the state of incorporation was New York).

262. Where deepening insolvency is claimed against someone other than a director or officer, the defendant should consider an in pari delicto defense. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
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Third, parties should familiarize themselves with deepening insolvency when litigating breach of fiduciary duty claims because some courts have dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claims on the basis that they are “disguised” deepening insolvency charges. Other courts have disagreed and held that claims of breach of the duty of loyalty, even if they resemble deepening insolvency claims, should not be dismissed on that basis. But duty of care claims are more likely to be rejected on the basis that they are too akin to a discredited deepening insolvency theory:

Duty of care violations more closely resemble causes of action for deepening insolvency because the alleged injury in both is the result of the board of directors’ poor business decision. To defeat such an action, a defendant need only prove that the process of reaching the final decision was not the result of gross negligence. Therefore, claims alleging a due care violation could be viewed as a deepening insolvency claim by another name.

Thus, deepening insolvency retains its relevance even after cases like Trenwick.

Conclusion

As this article shows, the law of fiduciary duties of directors and officers of troubled companies and the law of deepening insolvency have undertaken somewhat of a metamorphosis over the past decade. Some changes were seismic, such as Trenwick’s rejection of deepening insolvency, Gheewalla’s rejection of the concept of the zone of insolvency and of direct fiduciary duties being owed to creditors, and to a lesser extent, Bax’s holding that creditors of an LLC cannot obtain standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims. Other developments are more subtle, but advance significantly an understanding of how Delaware law should be interpreted in some fairly typical but not always litigated situations, such as Quadrant’s rejection of a theory that the business judgment rule can be rebutted upon a
showing that a dominated board took on risk that only benefitted equity that its members owned, and *Trados'* holding that preferred stockholders are not owed special fiduciary duties in addition to the duties owed to common stockholders, even if preferred stock is the fulcrum security.  

All of these cases will now be interpreted by bankruptcy judges across the country, because insolvent entities often wind up in bankruptcy court and litigation in bankruptcy courts is frequent. How bankruptcy courts will apply the learning of these cases and plug the gaps of issues not yet raised will be interesting to follow over the next cycle of bankruptcy filings.

