Judge Andrews Denies Pretrial Motions for Summary Judgment and Daubert Motion
May 31, 2017
Publication| Intellectual Property
On April 28, 2017, in AVM Technologies LLC v. Intel Corporation, C.A. No. 15-33-RGA (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2017), Judge Andrews issued three pretrial decisions. First, the Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that the defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to create a dispute of material fact about whether the Pentium Pro anticipated the asserted claims, and also that the defendant did not timely disclose its anticipation theory. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument as to timeliness, finding that the defendant had disclosed the theory in its invalidity contentions and expert report. As to the merits, Judge Andrews found a genuine dispute of material fact as to anticipation and disagreed with the plaintiff’s interpretation of the Court’s claim construction.
Second, Judge Andrews denied the plaintiff’s motion to exclude the defense expert’s invalidity testimony. The plaintiff argued that the expert’s anticipation opinion was unreliable because the expert relied on “uncorroborated statements” made by “an Intel engineer and former engineer/paid consultant” and that the expert’s anticipation opinions were conclusory. The Court disagreed with each of the plaintiff’s arguments and denied its motion.
Last, the Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the defendant’s reverse doctrine of equivalents defense. The defendant had pointed to evidence in the record showing that its expert opined on the function of each of the claim limitations at issue and how the defendant’s accused products “operate in a substantially different way with respect to” the limitations. Judge Andrews found evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact “as to whether Defendant’s products perform[ed] the same function as the claimed invention in a substantially different way.”
Key Points: The Court viewed the plaintiff’s expert objections as going to the weight of the evidence, “a topic appropriate for cross-examination rather than summary judgment.”